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Abstract 
What are the effects of strengthening developing countries’ protection for intellectual property 
rights on economic growth, social welfare and income inequality in the global economy? To analyze this 
question, we develop a two-country R&D-based growth model with wealth heterogeneity. We find that 
the North experiences higher growth and welfare at the expense of higher income inequality while the 
South experiences higher growth at the expense of lower welfare and higher income inequality. As for 
global welfare, there exists a critical degree of cross-country spillovers below (above) which global 
welfare decreases (increases). In light of these findings, we discuss policy implications on China’s 
accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001.  
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1. Introduction 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) establishes a minimum level of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection that must be 
provided by all member countries by 2006. Given that developed countries (the North) generally had a 
much higher level of IPR protection than developing countries (the South) prior to TRIPS, this agreement 
is likely to have asymmetric effects on the North and the South. As an example of the North (the South), 
we consider the US (China). Table 1 presents the index of patent rights from Park (2008) for the US and 
China.1 It shows that as a result of TRIPS, the level of patent protection in China is converging towards 
the level in the US.2 Given the importance of TRIPS, this study analyzes its effects on economic growth, 
social welfare and income inequality in the global economy. 
Year 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
China 1.33 1.33 2.12 3.09 4.08
United States 4.68 4.68 4.88 4.88 4.88
Table 1: Index of Patent Rights from Park (2008)
 
Specifically, we develop a two-country R&D-based growth model with wealth heterogeneity 
among households. In the model, both the North and the South invest in R&D, but the North has a higher 
degree of innovative capability than the South. Within this framework, we derive the following results. 
Firstly, strengthening patent protection in either country increases both countries’ (a) economic growth by 
increasing R&D and (b) income inequality by raising the return on assets. Then, following Grossman and 
Lai (2004) and Lai and Qiu (2003), we derive the pre-TRIPS Nash equilibrium level of patent protection 
that is sub-optimally low due to the positive externality of patent policy. Also, we find that the North 
chooses a higher level of patent protection than the South and imposing the North’s higher level of patent 
protection on the South as required by TRIPS increases (decreases) welfare in the North (the South).3 
                                                 
1 The index is a scale of 0 to 5, and a larger number indicates stronger patent protection. See Park (2008) for details.  
2 As a result of TRIPS, the statutory term of patent in the US was extended from 17 years (counting from the issue 
date of the patent) to 20 years (counting from the earliest filing date). However, due to the difference in the starting 
date, the effective extension was minimal. As for China, it extended the patent length from 15 to 20 years in 1992. 
Prior to joining the WTO, China reformed its patent system again in 2000 in compliance with the TRIPS agreement; 
see footnote 4 for details of this reform. 
3 See, for example, Reichman (1995) for a more detailed discussion on the requirements of TRIPS. 
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This welfare implication is consistent with Grossman and Lai (2004) and Lai and Qiu (2003). It is 
perhaps not surprising that the South would be worse off by deviating from its best response. Therefore, 
the intriguing question is whether TRIPS would improve or reduce global welfare. We find that there 
exists a critical degree of cross-country spillovers below (above) which global welfare is lower (higher) 
under TRIPS while Lai and Qiu (2003) find that global welfare always improves as a result of TRIPS. 
This difference arises because we introduce a structural parameter to allow for varying degrees of cross-
country spillovers captured by the importance of foreign goods in domestic consumption. In our model, 
the degree of the positive externality in the Nash equilibrium is determined by this structural parameter. 
When the share of foreign goods in domestic consumption is small, cross-country spillovers of innovation 
are small as well. In this case, imposing the North’s level of patent protection on the South makes the 
South worse off without making the North much better off. This finding has important policy implications. 
First, it implies that the North is not always able to compensate the South even in the presence of costless 
transfers. Secondly, a sufficient degree of global integration is necessary in order for the harmonization of 
IPR protection to improve global welfare.  
Furthermore, our model with heterogeneous households enables us to analyze the effects of 
TRIPS on income inequality within each country in addition to growth and welfare. Under TRIPS, the 
North experiences higher growth and higher welfare at the expense of higher income inequality. As for 
the South, it experiences higher growth at the expense of lower welfare and higher income inequality. 
Intuitively, a higher growth rate increases the rate of return on assets through the Euler equation, and this 
higher return on assets increases the income of asset-wealthy households relative to asset-poor households 
in each country. This result suggests that although the representative-agent welfare analysis of TRIPS in 
previous studies can be robust to an extension with heterogeneous households, it is useful to also analyze 
the distributional consequences within a country given that income inequality can be a social concern. 
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For example, China amended its patent law in 2000 in anticipation of its accession to the WTO in 
2001.4 Since this amendment, the annual growth rate of applications for invention patents in China has 
increased to 23% (compared to less than 10% before 2000). Hu and Jefferson (2009) provide empirical 
evidence to show that the patent-law amendment in 2000 is a major factor for China’s recent surge in 
patenting activities. Also, R&D as a share of GDP in China increases from an average of about 0.7% in 
the 90’s to 1.49% in 2007.5 At the same time, the rising income inequality in China poses the country a 
serious challenge on domestic stability. In 2007, China’s Gini coefficient rises to 0.47 that is above the 
threshold of 0.45 indicating potential social unrest. Our theoretical analysis suggests that strengthening 
IPR protection in China as a result of TRIPS worsens its income inequality in addition to potentially 
reducing its social welfare as also implied by previous studies. Given the current situation in China, the 
distributional consequence seems to be more alarming. In a panel regression, Adams (2008) finds that 
strengthening IPR protection indeed has a positive and statistically significant effect on income inequality. 
His estimates imply that increasing Park’s (2008) index by one (on a scale of zero to five) is associated 
with an increase in the Gini coefficient of 0.01 to 0.02 (on a scale of zero to one) in developing countries. 
We should emphasize that there are also other important factors contributing to the rising income 
inequality in China, and patent policy is only one of them. Furthermore, China’s accession to the WTO 
carries other benefits, such as lower trade barriers, which are not considered in this partial analysis of 
patent policy. In the model, we introduce a parameter to capture trade barriers and find that lower trade 
barriers improve social welfare. Therefore, a complete welfare analysis on China’s accession to the WTO 
should trade off the welfare gain from lower trade barriers against the welfare loss from TRIPS. 
Our study relates to the literature on IPR protection and North-South trade. Early studies in this 
literature focus on the effects of IPR in reducing imitation from the South and encouraging technology 
transfer from the North through licensing or foreign direct investment. In these studies, innovative 
                                                 
4 The changes include (a) providing patent holders with the right to obtain a preliminary injunction against the 
infringing party before filing a lawsuit, (b) stipulating standards to compute statutory damages, (c) affirming that 
state and non-state enterprises enjoy equal patent rights, and (d) simplifying the patent application process, 
examination and transfer procedures and unifying the appeal system. 
5 This data is obtained from China Statistical Yearbook. 
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activities are usually assumed to take place only in the North.6 However, two other important reasons for 
strengthening IPR in the South are (a) to provide incentives for the North to develop technologies that are 
also used by the South,7 and (b) to provide incentives for the South to invest in innovative activities.8 To 
fill in this gap in the literature, recent theoretical studies, such as Lai and Qiu (2003) and Grossman and 
Lai (2004), have started to consider the important role of TRIPS in providing sufficient incentives for 
innovation in both the North and the South. Our paper follows this branch of studies to focus on this 
aspect of TRIPS. 
Lai and Qiu (2003) and Grossman and Lai (2004) derive the Nash equilibrium level of patent 
protection in an open-economy variety-expanding model, in which both the North and the South invest in 
R&D, and analyze the welfare effects of harmonizing IPR protection. We complement these interesting 
studies by analyzing the effects of TRIPS on the growth-inequality tradeoff in a quality-ladder model with 
endogenous growth and by allowing for varying degrees of cross-country spillovers. To our knowledge, 
our study is the first to analyze the effects of TRIPS on welfare, growth and inequality simultaneously. 
Modeling varying degrees of cross-country spillovers also has surprising implications on global welfare. 
Since the seminal study of Simon Kuznets (1955), the tradeoff between growth and inequality has 
been an important issue in economics. On one hand, early theoretical and empirical studies tend to find a 
negative growth-inequality relationship.9 On the other hand, the more recent studies tend to find a positive 
relationship.10 Forbes (2000) finds a positive empirical growth-inequality relationship and argues that the 
different results in previous studies are due to omitted-variable bias and measurement error. García-
Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2006, 2007) argue that the theoretical growth-inequality relationship should be 
                                                 
6 See Grossman and Helpman (1991b), Helpman (1993), Lai (1998), Yang and Maskus (2001) and Glass and Saggi 
(2002b). While Glass and Saggi (2002a) consider a model with two symmetric innovating countries, Dinopoulos and 
Segerstrom (2010) consider a model in which Northern firms invest in innovative R&D and their Southern affiliates 
invest in adaptive R&D for technology transfer from the North. 
7 See, for example, Diwan and Rodrik (1991).  
8 For example, in a panel regression, Chen and Puttitanun (2005) find that strengthening IPR in developing countries 
indeed has a positive and significant effect on their innovations. 
9 See Galor and Zeira (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Perotti (1996). 
10 See Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), Benabou (1996), Galor and Tsiddon (1997), Li and Zou (1998) and Forbes 
(2000). Barro (2000) finds a positive (negative) growth-inequality relationship in developed (developing) countries. 
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ambiguous and depends on the underlying structural changes. Incorporating wealth heterogeneity into an 
AK growth model, they show that a positive relationship is more likely to emerge. 
Although the capital-accumulation-driven growth models are useful frameworks for analyzing 
many macroeconomic issues, they are not suitable for evaluating innovation policies. Therefore, this 
study incorporates wealth heterogeneity into an open-economy R&D-based growth model to analyze the 
effects of TRIPS. In a related study, Chu (2010) analyzes the effects of patent policy on the growth-
inequality tradeoff in the US using a closed-economy quality-ladder model with wealth heterogeneity.11 
The present study differs from Chu (2010) by (a) developing an open-economy model, (b) deriving the 
level of patent protection as the outcome of a policy game between countries, and (c) considering the 
effects of patent policy on welfare in addition to growth and income inequality. As argued by Chen and 
Turnovsky (2010), “…virtually the entire growth-inequality literature is restricted to a closed economy, 
which is a severe shortcoming given the increasing openness characterizing most economies.” 
This paper also relates to the literature on R&D underinvestment, patent policy and economic 
growth. Griliches (1992) provides a survey on empirical studies that find the social return to R&D to be 
much higher than the private return. Jones and Williams (1998, 2000) use these empirical estimates to 
show that in an R&D-based growth model, the socially optimal level of R&D is at least two to four times 
higher than the market level. A number of studies, such as Li (2001), O’Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004) 
and Chu (2009), analyze how patent breadth increases R&D and economic growth in R&D-based growth 
models that feature a representative household. Given that patent policy may affect the distribution of 
income, the present study contributes to this literature by providing a growth-theoretic framework that 
highlights the distributional consequences of patent policy in an open economy. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 defines the 
equilibrium and analyzes its properties. Section 4 considers the effects of TRIPS on growth, welfare and 
income inequality. Section 5 concludes with some suggestions for future research. 
                                                 
11 See also Chou and Talmain (1996), Li (1998), Zweimuller (2000), Foellmi and Zweimuller (2006) and Bertola et 
al. (2006). These studies focus on the effects of inequality on growth but do not consider the effects of patent policy 
on income inequality. 
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2. The model 
The underlying quality-ladder model is based on Grossman and Helpman (1991a). We modify the model 
by (a) extending it to a two-country setting with trade in intermediate inputs similar to Peng et al. (2006), 
(b) allowing for wealth heterogeneity among households, and (c) considering incomplete patent breadth 
(i.e., patent protection against imitation) as in Li (2001).12 There are two countries denoted by the North 
(n) and the South (s). As in Lai and Qiu (2003) and Grossman and Lai (2004), both countries invest in 
R&D, but the North has a higher degree of innovative capability than the South. Also, trade is balanced as 
commonly assumed in the literature. Given that the quality-ladder growth model has been well-studied, 
the familiar components of the model will be briefly described in Sections 2.1 to 2.4. To conserve space, 
we only present the equations for the North. However, the readers are advised to keep in mind that for 
each equation that we present, there is an analogous equation for the South. 
 
 2.1. Households  
There is a continuum of identical households (except for the initial holding of wealth) on the unit interval 
]1,0[∈h  in each of the two countries indexed by a superscript },{ sn∈ . Households are immobile across 
countries. In country n, household h’s utility function is given by  
(1) ∫∞ −=
0
)(ln)( . dthCehU nt
tn ρ .13 
)(hCnt  denotes the consumption of household h in country n at time t. 0>ρ  is the exogenous discount 
rate. Each household maximizes utility subject to the following law of motion for asset accumulation. 
(2) )()()( hCPWhVRhV nt
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t −+=& . 
                                                 
12 Lai and Qiu (2003) and Grossman and Lai (2004) consider patent protection in the form of patent length in their 
variety-expanding models. Given that we have a quality-ladder model, we consider patent protection in the form of 
patent breadth, which is an equally important patent-policy instrument commonly discussed in the patent-design 
literature. Using China as an example, its statutory length of patent has been 20 years since 1993. 
13 In a similar (closed-economy) model, Chu (2010) considers a more general iso-elastic utility function and shows 
that the positive relationship between patent protection and income inequality is robust to this specification change. 
To simplify the analytical derivation, we focus on the log utility function in this study. 
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)(hV nt  is the value of financial assets owned by household h in country n at time t. Household h’s share 
of financial assets at time 0 is exogenously given by nnnv VhVhs 000, /)()( ≡  that has a general distribution 
function with a mean of one and a standard deviation of nvσ  (i.e., the coefficient of variation of wealth). 
n
tR  is the nominal rate of return on assets in country n. We assume home bias in asset holding such that 
the shares of monopolistic firms in each country are solely owned by domestic households.14 Household h 
inelastically supplies one unit of labor to earn a wage income ntW . 
n
tP  is the price of consumption in 
country n. From household h’s intertemporal optimization, the familiar Euler equation is given by 
(3) ρ−== ntn
t
n
t
n
t
n
t r
C
C
hC
hC &&
)(
)(
, 
where nt
n
t
n
t
n
t PPRr /&−≡  is the real interest rate in country n. Equation (3) shows that consumption of 
households within a country grows at the same rate.  
 
2.2. Final goods 
Consumption in country n is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of two types of final goods.15 
(4) αα
αα
αα −
−
−= 1
,1,
)1(
)()( snt
nn
tn
t
CCC , 
where sntC
,  refers to final goods (in country n) that are produced with intermediate inputs imported from 
country s. The parameter ]5.0,0[∈α  captures the importance of foreign goods in domestic consumption. 
Later on, we will show that this parameter also determines the degree of cross-country spillovers. There is 
                                                 
14 It is useful to note that home bias does not eliminate the positive externality of IPR protection in generating profits 
to be earned by foreign households. When a country strengthens IPR protection, foreign firms owned by foreign 
households still earn a larger amount of profits. What home bias does is to naturally link the degree of this positive 
externality to the share of goods traded, which is determined by the domestic importance of foreign goods. 
15 This type of Armington aggregator is commonly used in open-economy macroeconomic models for aggregating 
tradable goods across countries. A more general form of Armington aggregator is of the CES form, which we do not 
consider because we want to allow nntC
,  and sntC
,  to grow at different rates. 
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a large number of competitive firms producing final goods with a standard Cobb-Douglas aggregator over 
a continuum of differentiated intermediates goods ]1,0[∈i . 
(5) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∫1
0
,, )(lnexp diiCC nnt
nn
t , 
(6) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∫1
0
,, )(lnexp diiCC snt
sn
t . 
)(, iC snt  refers to intermediate goods i (in country n) that are produced by inputs from country s. 
  
 2.3. Intermediate goods 
In country n, there is a continuum of industries indexed by ]1,0[∈i . In each industry, an industry leader 
produces )(, iX nnt  and )(
, iX nst  (which are the necessary inputs for )(
, iC nnt  and )(
, iC nst  respectively) and 
dominates the market until the arrival of the next innovation.16 The leader holds a patent in each country 
on the industry’s latest technology. Using the leader’s input )(, iX nnt , the level of output for )(
, iC nnt  is   
(7) )()( ,)(, iXziC nnt
iNnn
t
n
t= . 
1>z  is the exogenous step size of quality improvement from each innovation, and )(iN nt  is the number 
of innovations that have occurred in industry i of country n as of time t. In other words, )(iN
n
tz  represents 
the quality of each unit of input produced by the leader while )(, iX nnt  is the quantity of input produced. 
Similarly, using the leader’s input )(, iX nst , the level of output for )(
, iC nst  is   
(8) )()1()( ,)(, iXziC nst
iNns
t
n
tτ−= , 
where )1,0[∈τ  denotes an iceberg transportation cost that captures trade barriers.  
                                                 
16 Grossman and Helpman (1991a) show that the next innovation comes from another innovator due to the Arrow 
displacement effect. 
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 To produce one unit of )(, iX nnt  or )(
, iX nst , the industry leader needs to employ one unit of 
workers. Therefore, the production function is  
(9) )()()()()( ,
,
,
,
,
,, iLiLiLiXiX n tx
ns
tx
nn
tx
ns
t
nn
t =+=+ . 
)(, iL
n
tx  is the total number of workers employed in industry i of country n. The leader’s marginal cost of 
producing one unit of )(, iX nnt  or )(
, iX nst  is 
(10) nt
n
t WiMC =)( . 
Implicitly, we have assumed that the industry leader must employ domestic workers to produce for both 
domestic and foreign markets and abstracted from the issues of foreign direct investment, licensing and 
overseas imitation in order to keep the model tractable.17  
As commonly assumed in quality-ladder models, the current and former industry leaders engage 
in Bertrand competition, and the familiar profit-maximizing price for the current industry leader is a 
constant markup over the marginal cost. The prices for )(, iX nnt  and )(
, iX nst  are respectively 
(11) )(),()(, iMCbziP nt
nnn
t μ= , 
(12) )(),()(, iMCbziP nt
sns
t μ= , 
where bzbz =),(μ  for ]1,0(∈b . nb  ( sb ) captures the level of patent breadth in country n (s). In 
Grossman and Helpman (1991a), there is complete patent protection against imitation (i.e., 1=b ). Li 
(2001) generalizes the policy environment to capture incomplete patent protection against imitation (i.e., 
]1,0(∈b ).18 Due to incomplete patent breadth, the former leader can partly imitate the current leader’s 
invention in order to increase the quality of her product by a factor of 
nbz −1  (
sbz −1 ) in country n (s) 
without infringing the current leader’s patents. As a result, the limit-pricing markups for the current leader 
                                                 
17 These interesting issues have been studied in a related literature. See Grossman and Helpman (1991b), Helpman 
(1993), Lai (1998), Yang and Maskus (2001), Glass and Saggi (2002a, b) and Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010). 
18 This is known as lagging patent breadth in the literature. See, for example, O’Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004) 
for an analysis of leading patent breadth in dynamic general-equilibrium models. For the purpose of the current 
study, the consideration of lagging patent breadth is more relevant for developing countries. 
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are 
nbz  in country n and 
sbz  in country s respectively. An increase in b  in either country enables the 
current leader to charge a higher markup in that country. The resulting increases in profits and the value 
of inventions improve the incentives for R&D. From the rest of this study, we denote patent protection as 
),( nn bzμμ ≡  for convenience and consider changes in nμ  coming from changes in nb  only. 
  
 2.4. R&D 
Denote the expected value of an innovation in industry i of country n as )(~ iV nt . Due to the Cobb-Douglas 
specification in (5) and (6), the amount of profits is the same across industries within a country (i.e., 
nn
t
nn
t i
,, )( ππ =  and nstnst i ,, )( ππ =  for ]1,0[∈i ). As a result, ntnt ViV ~)(~ =  in a symmetric equilibrium that 
features an equal innovation arrival rate across industries within a country.19 We denote the sum of profits 
generated by an innovation in country n as nst
nn
t
n
t
,, πππ +≡ . Because of home bias in asset holding, the 
market value of inventions in country n equals the total value of assets owned by domestic households 
(i.e., nt
n
t VV =~ ). The familiar no-arbitrage condition for ntV  as an asset is  
(13) nt
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t VVVR λπ −+= & , 
which equates the interest rate to the asset return per unit of assets. The right-hand side of (13) consists of 
the sum of (a) the monopolistic profit ntπ  generated by this asset, (b) the potential capital gain ntV& , and (c) 
the expected capital loss nt
n
tVλ  due to creative destruction for which ntλ  is the Poisson arrival rate of 
innovation in country n. 
 There is a continuum of R&D entrepreneurs indexed by ]1,0[∈j  in each country, and they hire 
workers for R&D. The expected profit for entrepreneur j in country n is 
(14) )()()( ,, jLWjVj
n
tr
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
tr −= λπ . 
                                                 
19 We follow the standard approach in the literature to focus on the symmetric equilibrium. See Cozzi et al. (2007) 
for a theoretical justification for the symmetric equilibrium in the quality-ladder growth model. 
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The Poisson arrival rate of innovation for entrepreneur j in country n is )()( , jLj
n
tr
nn
t ϕλ = , where nϕ  is 
the productivity of R&D workers (i.e., innovative capability) in country n. Without loss of generality, we 
assume sn ϕϕ ≥ . Because of free entry, R&D entrepreneurs make zero expected profit such that 
(15) nt
nn
t WV =ϕ . 
This condition determines the allocation of labor between production and R&D within each country.  
 
3. Decentralized equilibrium 
In this section, we define the equilibrium and show that the aggregate economy is always on a unique and 
stable balanced-growth path. In Section 3.1, we show that the wealth distribution is stationary. In Section 
3.2, we consider the income distribution. In Section 3.3, we derive a welfare function for policymakers 
and characterize the Nash equilibrium as well as the globally optimal patent protection. 
Equilibrium is a time path of prices ∞=0
,, }),(),(),(,,,{ t
n
t
n
t
ns
t
nn
t
n
t
n
t
n
t VhViPiPPWR  and allocations 
∞
=0
,,
,,
,,,, },,),(),(),(),(),(),(),({ t
sn
t
nn
t
n
t
n
t
n
tr
n
tx
ns
t
nn
t
ns
t
nn
t CCChCjLiLiXiXiCiC . Also, at each instant of time,  
a. household h  chooses )}({ hCnt  to maximize (1) subject to (2) taking },,{
n
t
n
t
n
t PWR  as given;  
b. perfectly competitive final-goods firms maximize profit taking prices as given; 
c. the leader in industry i  produces )}(),({ ,, iXiX nst
nn
t  and chooses )}(),(),({ ,
,, iLiPiP n tx
ns
t
nn
t  to 
maximize profit according to the Bertrand competition and taking }{ ntW  as given; 
d. R&D entrepreneur j  chooses )}({ , jL
n
tr  to maximize profit taking },{
n
t
n
t VW  as given;  
e. the market for consumption clears such that αα
αα
αα −
−
−==∫ 1
,1,1
0 )1(
)()()(
sn
t
nn
tn
t
n
t
CCCdhhC ; 
f. the market for domestic final goods clears such that ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∫1
0
,, )(lnexp diiCC nnt
nn
t ; 
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g. the market for foreign final goods clears such that ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∫1
0
,, )(lnexp diiCC snt
sn
t ;
20 
h. the domestic market for intermediate goods i clears, i.e., )()( ,)(, iXziC nnt
iNnn
t
n
t= ; 
i. the overseas market for intermediate goods i clears, i.e., )()1()( ,)(, iXziC nst
iNns
t
n
tτ−= ; 
j. the labor market clears such that 1)()(
1
0
,
1
0
, =+ ∫∫ djjLdiiL n trn tx ; and 
k. the value of trade in intermediate goods is balanced such that nst
ns
t
sn
t
sn
t CPCP
,,,, = .21 
 
Lemma 1: The aggregate economy is always on a unique and stable balanced-growth path, in which the 
equilibrium allocation of labor in country n is given by  
(16) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=
−− nn
nnnn
xL ϕ
ρ
μ
αϕμ 11),(, , 
(17) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
−− ns
nsns
xL ϕ
ρ
μ
αϕμ 1),(, , 
(18) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−−=
+++ nsn
nsnn
rL ϕ
ρ
μ
α
μ
αϕμμ 111),,( . 
Proof: See Appendix A.■  
 
Lemma 1 shows that the aggregate economy always jumps immediately to a unique and stable 
balanced-growth path. Furthermore, the properties of the equilibrium labor allocation are quite intuitive. 
An increase in nμ , sμ  or nϕ  improves the incentives for R&D. As a result, labor is reallocated away 
from the production sector to the R&D sector. To ensure that 0>nrL , we impose a lower bound on R&D 
productivity.  
                                                 
20 To be more precise, we are referring to final goods produced using foreign intermediate inputs. 
21 These price indices will be defined in the proof of Lemma 1. 
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Condition R (R&D productivity): )1/( −Γ> nn ρϕ , 
where 
1
1
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−≡Γ snn μ
α
μ
α
.  
 Given the equilibrium allocation of labor, the next lemma characterizes the equilibrium outcomes 
for other aggregate variables. In (19), the arrival rate of innovation is increasing in domestic R&D. In (20), 
the growth rate of consumption in country n is increasing in the arrival rate of innovation in each country. 
Therefore, an increase in nμ , sμ , nϕ  or sϕ  increases domestic R&D and/or foreign R&D as well as the 
consumption growth rate in each country. As for the level of consumption, it is derived in (21). 
 
Lemma 2: On the balanced-growth path, the other aggregate variables are given by  
(19) nr
nnsnn Lϕϕμμλ =
+++
),,( , 
(20) zg
C
C snsnsnn
n
t
n
t ln])1[(),,,( .λαλαϕϕμμ +−=≡
++++
&
, 
(21) n
t
n
t
n
n
t P
WC ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ += ϕ
ρ1 . 
Proof: See Appendix A.■  
 
3.1. Wealth distribution 
I adopt a similar approach as in García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2006, 2007) to show that the distribution 
of wealth is stationary on the balanced growth path. The value of wealth in country n evolves according to  
(22) nt
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t CPWVRV −+=& . 
Combining (2) and (22), the law of motion for tttv VhVhs /)()(, ≡  is given by  
(23) n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
tv
n
tv
V
CPW
hV
hCPW
hs
hs −−−=
)(
)(
)(
)(
,
,& . 
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From (15) and (21), )(, hs
n
tv  evolves according to a simple linear differential equation given by  
(24) nn
n
c
n
tv
n
tv hshshs ϕϕ
ρρ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−+= 1)(1)()( ,, .& . 
(24) describes the potential evolution of )(, hs
n
tv  given an initial value of )(0, hs
n
v . 
n
t
n
t
n
c ChChs /)()( ≡  is a 
stationary variable from (3), so that the last term in (24) is constant. The coefficient on )(, hs
n
tv  given by 
ρ  is constant and positive. Therefore, the only solution consistent with long-run stability is 0)(, =hsn tv&  
for all t. From (24), 0)(, =hsn tv&  for all t implies that )()( 0,, hshs nvn tv =  and 
(25) n
t
n
t
n
n
vn
t P
WhshC ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ += ϕ
ρ )(
1)( 0,
.
 
for all t. Lemma 3 summarizes the stationarity of the wealth distribution in country n. 
 
Lemma 3: For every household h in country n, )()( 0,, hshs
n
v
n
tv =  for all t.   
Proof: Proven in the text.■  
 
3.2. Income distribution 
In this section, we derive a measure of income inequality. We consider inequality in real income, which is 
the appropriate measure because it is invariant to the unit of denomination. Household h’s real income 
)(hY nt  is the sum of the real return on financial assets and the real wage rate given by  
(26) nt
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t PWPhVrhY //)()( += . 
From (3), (15) and Lemma 3, the share of real income earned by household h simplifies to  
(27) nn
nn
v
n
n
t
n
tn
ty g
hsg
Y
hYhs ϕρ
ϕρ
++
++=≡ )()()()( 0,,  
for all t. The standard deviation of income share (i.e., the coefficient of variation of income) is   
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(28) nvnn
n
n
ty
n
y g
gdhhs σϕρ
ρσ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++
+=−≡ ∫1
0
2
, ]1)([ , 
where the coefficient of variation of wealth nvσ  is exogenously given at time 0.22 We follow García-
Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2006, 2007) to use the coefficient of variation of income as a measure of 
income inequality. Proposition 1 summarizes the growth-inequality tradeoff in this model. 
 
Proposition 1: Holding ρ  and nϕ  constant, income inequality nyσ  is increasing in the growth rate ng . 
Proof: See (28).■ 
 
Intuitively, a higher growth rate drives up the real interest rate through the Euler equation, and the 
resulting higher rate of asset return increases the income share )(hsny  of asset-wealthy households (i.e., 
1)( >hsnv ) while it decreases that of asset-poor households (i.e., 1)( <hsnv ). This positive relationship 
between growth and inequality is consistent with recent empirical studies, such as Li and Zou (1998) and 
Forbes (2000). Next, we consider the effects of an exogenous increase in patent protection on growth and 
income inequality. Corollary 1 shows that a higher level of patent protection in either country increases 
R&D, economic growth and income inequality in both countries. 
 
Corollary 1: An increase in nμ  or sμ  increases growth and income inequality in both countries.  
Proof: See (20) and (28).■ 
 
                                                 
22 Equation (28) indicates an interesting difference between the AK model and the quality-ladder model. The AK 
model in García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2006, 2007) requires elastic labor supply to generate an endogenous 
income distribution while the quality-ladder model generates an endogenous income distribution even with inelastic 
labor supply. See Chu (2010) for a quality-ladder model with heterogeneous households and elastic labor supply. 
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3.3. Social welfare 
Due to the balanced-growth behavior of the model, the utility of household h in country n simplifies to  
(29) 2
0 )(ln)( ρρ
nn
n ghChU += , 
Substituting (25) into (29) yields 
(30) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ += ρϕ
ρ
ρ
n
n
n
n
n
vn g
P
WhshU
0
00, ln
)(
1ln1)(
.
. . 
The lifetime utility of a household depends on the growth rate and the initial level of consumption, which 
in turn depends on the initial real wage rate and the share of assets owned by the household. Although the 
ownership of assets varies across households, (30) shows that this household-specific term is independent 
of patent protection. This property is a result of the log utility function, and this convenient feature allows 
us to abstract from choosing a social welfare function for the government.  
 
Lemma 4: After dropping the exogenous terms, the initial real wage in country n can be decomposed into 
(31) )/ln()1ln(ln)/ln( 0000
snnnn WWPW αταμ +−+−= . 
Proof: See Appendix A.■ 
 
Lemma 4 shows that the initial real wage in country n has three components (a) the negative 
effect of markup pricing from patent protection, (b) the negative effect of trade barriers,23 and (c) the 
relative wage rate across the two countries. An expression for the relative wage can be derived from the 
balanced-trade condition snt
sn
t
ns
t
ns
t CPCP
,,,, = , which simplifies to  
(32) 11/1),( ,
,
≥⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=≡
−+ nsnsx
sn
x
s
n
snn
s
t
n
t
L
L
W
W
ϕ
ρ
ϕ
ρ
μ
μϕϕω  
                                                 
23 For example, the benefit of China’s accession to the WTO may be captured by a reduction in trade barriers that 
increases social welfare in China. 
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for all t. (32) shows that the relative wage is independent of patent protection and depends on the relative 
R&D productivity between the North and the South. Substituting (31) and (32) into (30) and dropping the 
terms that are independent of patent protection yield the welfare of any household h in country n as a 
function of nμ  and sμ  given by  
(33) ρ
μμμμμ ),(ln),(
snn
nsnn g+−≡Ω . 
Equation (33) has three interesting properties. Firstly, the welfare component that depends on 
patent protection is the same across households. Secondly, (33) captures the tradeoff between the static 
cost nμln−  and the dynamic benefit ρ/ng  of patent protection as in the seminal study of Nordhaus 
(1969). Thirdly, (33) and the analogous condition for the South show that while the welfare cost of raising 
nμ  falls entirely on the North, the welfare gain is shared with the South because sg  is increasing in nμ . 
Due to this positive externality, the Nash equilibrium level of patent protection is suboptimal. To see this 
result, zg nss ln])1[( .λαλα +−=  is increasing in nμ  via two channels of cross-country spillovers: (a) 
nμ  increases sg  via nλ , and (b) nμ  increases sg  via sλ . Channel (a) captures technology spillovers 
across countries. Channel (b) captures the positive effect of domestic patent protection on foreign return 
to R&D. The degree of these cross-country spillover effects is determined by the structural parameter α . 
Upon deriving the welfare function, we firstly characterize the Nash equilibrium level of patent 
protection in the two countries denoted by ),( sNE
n
NE μμ . As in Grossman and Lai (2004), the policymaker 
in each country chooses the domestic level of patent protection once and for all at time 0 to maximize 
domestic households’ welfare in (33) taking the foreign level of patent protection as given. In other words, 
the policymakers in the two countries play a one-shot game at time 0. Also, we assume an interior 
solution for the equilibrium level of patent protection such that z<μ  (i.e., 1<b ) in each country. 
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Proposition 2: The Nash equilibrium level of patent protection is given by  
(34) z
sn
snn
NE ln11)1(),(
22 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−=
++ ρ
ϕαρ
ϕαϕϕμ , 
(35) z
ns
sns
NE ln11)1(),(
22 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−=
++ ρ
ϕαρ
ϕαϕϕμ . 
Proof: See Appendix A.■ 
 
As in Lai and Qiu (2003) and Grossman and Lai (2004), we find that the Nash equilibrium level 
of patent protection is stronger in the North than in the South unless either (a) 5.0=α  or (b) sn ϕϕ = . 
We assume that neither (a) nor (b) hold such that sNE
n
NE μμ > . In Proposition 3, we derive the globally 
optimal patent protection denoted by )max(arg),( snsGO
n
GO Ω+Ω≡μμ .24 If cross-country spillovers are 
absent (i.e., 0=α ), then nGOnNE μμ =  and sGOsNE μμ = . Otherwise, nGOnNE μμ <  and sGOsNE μμ <  implying 
suboptimal patent protection in the Nash equilibrium. For the rest of the analysis, we assume that 0>α . 
 
Proposition 3: The globally optimal level of patent protection is given by  
(36) nNE
sn
snn
GO z μρ
ϕαρ
ϕαϕϕμ >⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−=
++
ln11)1(),( , 
(37) sNE
ns
sns
GO z μρ
ϕαρ
ϕαϕϕμ >⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−=
++
ln11)1(),( . 
Proof: See Appendix A.■ 
 
Corollary 2: An increase in α increases nNEnGO μμ −  and sNEsGO μμ − . 
Proof: See Appendix A.■ 
                                                 
24 To be consistent with previous studies, we use this utilitarian approach to define global welfare.  
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Corollary 2 shows that the Nash equilibrium level of patent protection deviates from the globally 
optimal level as α  increases because the positive externality in the Nash equilibrium is increasing in α . 
Intuitively, a larger degree of cross-country spillovers raises the degree of positive externality and hence 
worsens the sub-optimality of the Nash equilibrium. 
 
4. Effects of TRIPS 
In this section, we analyze the effects of TRIPS on growth, welfare and income inequality. Following Lai 
and Qiu (2003), we define the policy regime under TRIPS as nNE
n
TRIPS
s
TRIPS μμμ == . In summary, we find 
that the North experiences higher growth, higher welfare and higher income inequality. As for the South, 
it experiences higher growth, lower welfare and higher income inequality. Under TRIPS, the South’s 
level of patent protection increases from sNEμ  to sTRIPSμ . This higher level of patent protection increases 
economic growth in both countries (i.e., nNE
n
TRIPS gg >  and sNEsTRIPS gg > ). However, the higher growth 
also raises inequality in both countries (i.e., n NEy
n
TRIPSy ,, σσ >  and s NEys TRIPSy ,, σσ > ). As for welfare, (33) 
shows that the higher growth in the North unambiguously increases its welfare (i.e., nNE
n
TRIPS Ω>Ω ). As 
for the South, the increase in sμ  causes opposing effects on its welfare. One is the positive growth effect. 
The other is the negative welfare effect of markup pricing that reduces consumption. However, from the 
definition of the Nash equilibrium, a unilateral deviation from the best response must render the South 
worse off (i.e., sNE
s
TRIPS Ω<Ω ). Proposition 4 summarizes these findings.  
 
Proposition 4: In the North, the effects of TRIPS on growth, welfare and income inequality are (a) 
n
NE
n
TRIPS gg > , (b) nNEnTRIPS Ω>Ω , and (c) n NEyn TRIPSy ,, σσ > . In the South, the effects of TRIPS on growth, 
welfare and income inequality are (a) sNE
s
TRIPS gg > , (b) sNEsTRIPS Ω<Ω , and (c) s NEys TRIPSy ,, σσ > . 
Proof: Proven in the text.■ 
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The above welfare implication is perhaps not surprising given the definition of Nash equilibrium. 
Therefore, the intriguing question is whether global welfare increases or decreases as a result of TRIPS, 
and we compare the level of global welfare between the Nash equilibrium and the policy regime under 
TRIPS. We find that there exists a critical degree of cross-country spillovers captured by α  below (above) 
which global welfare is lower (higher) under TRIPS. Proposition 5 summarizes this result, and Figure 1 
plots )()( sNE
n
NE
s
TRIPS
n
TRIPS Ω+Ω−Ω+Ω≡ΔΩ  against α . 
 
Proposition 5: There exists a cutoff value )5.0,0(∈α  such that (a) sNEnNEsTRIPSnTRIPS Ω+Ω<Ω+Ω  if 
),0( αα ∈ , and (b) sNEnNEsTRIPSnTRIPS Ω+Ω>Ω+Ω  if )5.0,(αα ∈ . 
Proof: See Appendix A.■ 
 
 
In Figure 1, we see that as α  approaches zero, 0<ΔΩ  because the two countries are almost in 
autarky and the South’s optimal patent protection is weaker than that of the North. Forcing the South to 
adopt the North’s level of patent protection causes the South to experience a welfare loss while the 
welfare gain for the North is negligible. As α  rises above 0, ΔΩ  increases in α  because the positive 
externality in the Nash equilibrium reduces the welfare loss in the South and increases the welfare gain in 
the North. As →α 0.5, ΔΩ  becomes zero because the Nash equilibrium is the same as the policy regime 
under TRIPS, such that sTRIPS
s
NE μμ = . When α  is slightly below 0.5, ΔΩ  becomes positive because 
s
GO
s
TRIPS
s
NE μμμ <<  implying that the South’s level of patent protection under TRIPS is moving towards 
Figure 1: Changes in global welfare under TRIPS 
α  
0.5
0 α
ΔΩ  
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the globally optimal level. For intermediate values of α , there exists a critical degree α  below (above) 
which global welfare under TRIPS is lower (higher) than in the Nash equilibrium. In other words, there 
must be a sufficient degree of global integration in order for a harmonization of IPR protection to improve 
global welfare. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the effects of TRIPS on growth, welfare and income inequality simultaneously. In 
summary, strengthening patent protection in developing countries as a result of TRIPS increases global 
economic growth but also worsens global income inequality. Whether it increases global welfare depends 
on the degree of cross-country spillovers. To derive these results, we incorporate wealth heterogeneity 
among households into an open-economy quality-ladder model. Our model belongs to the class of first-
generation R&D-based growth models that exhibit scale effects (i.e., a larger economy experiences faster 
growth). We eliminate scale effects by normalizing each country’s population size to unity.25  
In our model, we have abstracted from some interesting issues, such as licensing, foreign direct 
investment, and North-South product cycles. In reality, both of (a) technology transfer from the North to 
the South and (b) providing sufficient incentives for the South to innovate are important reasons for 
strengthening IPR in the South. For analytical tractability and the relative lack of attention to the latter 
issue in the literature, we follow Lai and Qiu (2003) and Grossman and Lai (2004) to focus on (b) only. 
Therefore, one direction for future research is to account for these issues in a model with heterogeneous 
households. Furthermore, given that the enforcement of IPR is as important as the statutory law in reality, 
it would be interesting for future studies to consider IPR enforcement as well. 
Although our model is designed to analyze the positive externality associated with IPR protection 
in developed and developing countries, the two countries in the model can easily be relabeled as two 
                                                 
25 The literature has two other ways of dealing with scale effects (a) the semi-endogenous growth model and (b) the 
second-generation model that combines quality improvement and variety expansion. Our model’s implication that 
devoting a larger share of labor to R&D would increase growth is consistent with the second-generation models. See, 
for example, Jones (1999) for a discussion on scale effects in R&D-based growth models. 
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developed countries by assuming that they have similar levels of R&D productivity. In this case, the Nash 
equilibrium level of patent protection continues to be lower than the globally optimal level as long as α  
is greater than zero. In other words, a coordination failure of patent policy can exist even among 
developed countries suggesting the importance of also evaluating whether the level of IPR protection 
chosen by developed countries is indeed optimal from the perspective of global welfare. 
Finally, in our model, income inequality is generated by an unequal distribution of (financial) 
capital income, and patent policy affects income inequality through the rate of return on assets. Therefore, 
even if inventions do not represent a significant share of assets in reality,26 the effect of patent policy on 
income inequality can still be significant in the presence of other capital incomes that depend on the real 
interest rate. Although the prevailing wisdom is that income inequality is mainly caused by an increase in 
the skill premium (i.e., the relative wage between skilled and unskilled workers), some studies, such as 
Atkinson (2000, 2003), argue that inequality in capital income is also playing an increasingly important 
role. For example, Reed and Cancian (2001) show that capital income contributes to one quarter of the 
increase in income inequality in the US in the 90’s while it accounts for less than one-tenth of the increase 
in the 70’s. Therefore, the current study also serves the purpose of providing an open-economy R&D-
based growth model that highlights the increasing importance of capital income on income inequality.  
 
                                                 
26 Nakamura (2003) calculates that the market value of intangible assets in the US is at least $5 trillion in 2000 (i.e., 
about 50% of US GDP). Although intangible assets include patents and copyrights that are innovation-related, they 
also include trademarks and goodwill that may be unrelated to innovation. 
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Appendix A 
Proof of Lemma 1: In this proof, we first show that aggregate expenditure on consumption nt
n
t
n
t CPE ≡  
in country n always jumps immediately to a unique and stable steady-state value. Then, we show that this 
steady-state value determines a unique and stationary equilibrium allocation of labor in country n. 
Choosing labor as the numeraire in country n (i.e., 1=ntW  for all t) implies that 1=nntV ϕ  for all t from 
(15). Given that nϕ  is constant, 0=ntV& . Integrating (2) over ]1,0[∈h  and then setting ntV&  to zero yield  
(A1) nnt
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t RVRWE ϕ/1+=+= . 
Using its definition, the law of motion for aggregate expenditure on consumption is given by  
(A2) ρ−=+= ntn
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t R
C
C
P
P
E
E &&&
 
from (3) because )(/)(/ hChCCC nt
n
t
n
t
n
t
&& =  for all ]1,0[∈h . Substituting (A1) into (A2) yields 
(A3) ρϕ −−= )1(/ ntnntnt EEE& , 
which is plotted in Figure 2. 
 
For any initial value of ntE  below 
nϕρ /1+ , ntE  eventually converges to zero violating the households’ 
utility maximization. For any initial value of ntE  above 
nϕρ /1+ , ntE  eventually increases to a point in 
which all the workers are allocated to production. A zero allocation of R&D workers violates the R&D 
n
tE  
n
tE&  
nϕ
ρ+1
0 
Figure 2 Phase Diagram 
 - 28 -
entrepreneurs’ profit maximization. Therefore, to be consistent with long-run stability, ntE  must always 
jump to its unique non-zero steady state given by 
(A4) nnE ϕρ /1+= . 
From (A2), 0=ntE&  implies that ρ=ntR  for all t. 
Next, we derive the equilibrium allocation of labor. The price index for αα
αα
αα −
−
−= 1
,1,
)1(
)()( snt
nn
tn
t
CCC  
is αα )()( ,1, snt
nn
t
n
t PPP
−≡ . The price index for nntC ,  is n
t
n
t
n
iN
nn
tnn
t Z
Wdi
z
iPP n
t
μ=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛≡ ∫1
0
)(
,
, )(lnexp  , where 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛≡ ∫ zdiiNZ ntnt ln)(exp 1
0
. Similarly, the price index for sntC
,  is s
t
s
t
n
sn
t Z
WP
)1(
,
τ
μ
−= . From (5), (7) and (9), 
the aggregate production function for nn tx
n
t
nn
t LZC
,
,
, = . Similarly, from (6), (8) and (9), the aggregate 
production function for sn tx
s
t
sn
t LZC
,
,
, )1( τ−= . For country n, the value of export is nstnst CP ,,  while the 
value of import is snt
sn
t CP
,, . The balanced-trade condition is  
(A5) sn txn
t
s
n
ns
tx
sn
t
sn
t
ns
t
ns
t LLCPCP
,
,
,
,
,,,, ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=⇔= ωμ
μ
,  
where st
n
t
n
t WW /≡ω  denotes the relative wage rate. The conditional demand functions in country n for 
domestic and foreign final goods are nt
n
t
nn
t
nn
t CPCP )1(
,, α−=  and ntntsntsnt CPCP .,, α= . Combining these 
two conditions yields 
(A6) nn tx
n
t
sn
tx
sn
t
sn
t
nn
t
nn
t LLCPCP ,,
,
,
,,,,
11
ωα
α
αα ⎟⎠
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⎛
−=⇔=− . 
Substituting (A6) into (A5) yields  
(A7) nn txs
n
ns
tx LL
,
,
,
, 1
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
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μ
.  
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Substituting )1/()1/( ,,
,, αμα −=−= nn txnnntnntnt LCPE  into (A4) yields (16). Then, substituting (16) into 
(A7) yields (17). Finally, substituting (16) and (17) into the labor-market clearing condition yields (18). A 
similar exercise yields the unique, stable and stationary equilibrium allocation of labor in country s.■ 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: The arrival rate of innovation in country n is  
(A8) n tr
nn
t L ,ϕλ = .  
The growth rate of ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∫∫ zdzdiiNZ t nntnt lnexpln)(exp
0
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0
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Z
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The balanced-growth rate of consumption in country n is  
(A10) z
Z
Z
Z
Z
C
C sn
s
t
s
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t ln])1[()1( .λαλααα +−=+−= &&& . 
Finally, aggregating (2) over ]1,0[∈h  yields the level of consumption in country n given by  
(A11) n
t
n
t
nn
t
n
t
n
t
n
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t P
W
P
VRWC ⎟⎟⎠
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⎛ +=+= ϕ
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because 0=ntV& , ρ=ntR  and ntnnt WV =ϕ .■ 
 
Proof of Lemma 4: The price index for consumption at time 0 is αα )()( ,0
1,
00
snnnn PPP −≡ , where 
nnnnn ZWP 00
,
0 /μ=  and ])1/[( 00,0 ssnsn ZWP τμ −=  from the proof of Lemma 1. The initial levels of 
technology ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛≡ ∫ zdiiNZ nn ln)(exp 1
0
00  and ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
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⎛≡ ∫ zdiiNZ ss ln)(exp 1
0
00  are exogenous. After dropping 
these exogenous terms, )/ln( 00
nn PW  simplifies to (31).■ 
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Proof of Proposition 2: After dropping the terms that are independent of patent protection, the welfare of 
any household h in country n is  
(A12) ρμ
n
nn g+−=Ω ln . 
The arrival rates of inventions in the two countries are  
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Substituting (A13) and (A14) into (A10) yields  
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Substituting (A15) into (A12) and then dropping the exogenous terms yield 
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Differentiating (A16) with respect to nμ  yields  
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Solving (A17) yields (34), and (35) can be obtained by a similar derivation.■  
 
Proof of Proposition 3: Combining (A16) and the analogous condition for country s yields  
(A18) ρρϕμ
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Differentiating (A18) with respect to nμ  yields  
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Solving (A19) yields (36), and (37) can be obtained by a similar derivation.■ 
 
Proof of Corollary 2: Subtracting (34) from (36) and differentiating nNE
n
GO μμ −  with respect to α  show 
that the sign of αμμ ∂−∂ /)( nNEnGO  is given by the sign of 0)21( >− α  for 5.0<α . Similarly, from (35) 
and (37), differentiating sNE
s
GO μμ −  with α  shows that the sign of αμμ ∂−∂ /)( sNEsGO  is also given by 
α21− .■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 5: As →α 0, sNEnNEsTRIPSnTRIPS Ω+Ω<Ω+Ω  because the countries are almost in 
autarky so that sTRIPS
s
GO μμ < . As →α 0.5, sNEnNEsTRIPSnTRIPS Ω+Ω=Ω+Ω  because the Nash equilibrium 
is the same as the policy regime under TRIPS such that sTRIPS
s
NE μμ = . The rest of the proof shows that 
there exists an intermediate range of α  for which sNEnNEsTRIPSnTRIPS Ω+Ω>Ω+Ω . From (34) and (37), 
s
TRIPS
s
GO μμ −  is an increasing function in α . As →α 0.5, sTRIPSsGO μμ > . Therefore, there must exist a 
threshold denoted by )5.0,0(~∈α  above which sGOsTRIPSsNE μμμ << . When )5.0,~[αα ∈ , it is sufficient 
for sNE
n
NE
s
TRIPS
n
TRIPS Ω+Ω>Ω+Ω  to hold, and there exists a lower critical value )~,0( αα ∈  above which 
s
NE
n
NE
s
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n
TRIPS Ω+Ω>Ω+Ω  still holds. In this case, the South’s level of patent protection moves from 
one suboptimal level to another suboptimal level (i.e., sTRIPS
s
GO
s
NE μμμ << ). In summary, when αα < , 
s
NE
n
NE
s
TRIPS
n
TRIPS Ω+Ω<Ω+Ω . As α  increases above α , the opposite is true.■ 
 
